SENSORVEILEDNING FOR SKRIFTLIG EKSAMEN ( SKOLEEKSAMEN ), POL 1000: INNFØRING I STATSVITENSKAP: INTERNASJONAL OG KOMPARATIV POLITIKK, VÅR 2015

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1 SENSORVEILEDNING FOR SKRIFTLIG EKSAMEN ( SKOLEEKSAMEN ), POL 1000: INNFØRING I STATSVITENSKAP: INTERNASJONAL OG KOMPARATIV POLITIKK, VÅR 2015 Førsteamanuensis Gunnar Fermann (ansvarlig faglærer) E-post: gunnar.fermann@svt.ntnu.no Tlf.: / Professor Jennifer Bailey Generelt a. Studentene skal besvare fire oppgaver (to i internasjonal politikk og to i komparativ politikk) innenfor rammen av fire timer. Dette gir i gjennomsnitt én time per oppgave. Dette må tas i betraktning ved karakterutmåling. b. Fra 1997 har gjennomsnittskarakteren i kurset (POL 1000/POL 105) vært C. c. Samlet karakter på skriftlig eksamen resulterer som et skjønnsmessig gjennomsnitt av delkarakterene på de fire besvarelsene. Del-resultatene veies likt. d. De oppgavespesifikke sensorveiledningene nedenfor er nettopp veiledende og skal ikke stå i veien for å belønne alternative besvarelser så lenge de innfrir kravet til relevans og demonstrerer faglig innsikt. De oppgavespesifikke sensorveiledningene skal mao. ikke oppfattes som autoriserte oppskrifter for hvordan en god besvarelse nødvendigvis må være disponert. Ingen sensorveiledning kan erstatte sensors gode faglige skjønn. EKSAMENSOPPGAVER I POL 1000, VÅR 2015 Besvar samtlige oppgaver fra internasjonal politikk og komparativ politikk. Internasjonal politikk Oppgave 1 Hva er utenrikspolitikk (definer) og hva skiller studiet av utenrikspolitikk fra studiet av internasjonal politikk? Hva legger vi i begrepet «utenrikspolitisk handlingsrom», og hvilke oppgaver har den utenrikspolitiske ledelse i så måte? Redegjør for utenrikspolitiske målsettinger og virkemidler. Til slutt: Hvilke teoretiske tankemåter gjenspeiler ulike utenrikspolitiske målsettinger? Utenrikspolitikken (UP) er rettet inn mot å ivareta statens interesser vis-á-vis de internasjonale omgivelsene. Dette er en minimumsdefinisjon av UP. En mer fyldestgjørende definisjon lyder slik: Utenrikspolitikk kan forstås som territorialstatens utad- og formålsrettede virksomhet der strategier velges og virkemidler anvendes i lys av statens kollektive selvforståelse (identitet), utenrikspolitiske målsettinger (interesser), maktmidler og de konkrete utfordringene staten står overfor. 1

2 «Utenrikspolitisk handlingsrom» er presisert som det settet av handlingsalternativer som er politisk mulige og operativt tilgjengelige for den strategiske ledelsen etter at eksterne og interne rammebetingelser har øvd innflytelse på et beslutningsproblem dvs. en politisk utfordring eller mulighet. Handlingsrommet kan være stort eller lite, men aldri ubegrenset. Det er strategiske ledelsen sine oppgave å (i) avklare handlingsrommet, (ii) relatere dette til egne interessevurderinger og utenrikspolitisk virkemiddelbruk, og om mulig (iii) utvide handlingsrommet. I pensum og forelesninger er studentene dessuten gjort kjent med at det kan gjøres et skille mellom utenrikspolitikkens politics - og policy -aspekt: Politics -aspektet aksentuerer UP som beslutningsstruktur og forhandlingsprosess, men policy er resultatet av den forutgående forhandlingsprosessen nemlig utfallsinnhold qua målsettinger og virkemiddelbruk. Dermed vokser en ytterligere distinksjon frem: Skillet mellom UP som intensjon (målsettinger og strategi) på den ene side, og atferd (faktisk virkemiddelbruk) på den andre. Mens studiet av UP er rettet inn mot å kartlegge og forklare staters intensjoner/ interesser og eksternt rettede atferd, handler studiet av internasjonal politikk om å studere betingelser for og effekter av samhandlingen mellom stater. I redegjørelsen for utenrikspolitikkens intensjonsaspekt (målsettinger) forventes det av en fyldestgjørende besvarelse at den fanger opp sentrale målsettinger som (i) ivaretakelse av territoriell sikkerhet og politisk uavhengighet, (ii) ivaretakelse av økonomisk sikkerhet og velferd, og (iii) prestisjehensyn og særlige målsettinger (herunder etnisk, ideologisk eller religiøst motiverte målsettinger). Når det gjelder målsettingenes teoretiske røtter vil en dyktig student gjenkjenne en klar realpolitisk motivering av ivaretakelse av territoriell sikkerhet, politisk uavhengighet og økonomisk sikkerhet, mens den liberale og radikale arven er klarere når det gjelder velferdsmålet. UP intensjoner om å eksportere egne verdier og styresett til andre land (menneskerettigheter, demokrati, Islam, revolusjon) representerer alle idealistiske føringer tuftet på en liberal, radikal eller konservativ plattform. Når det gjelder UP atferdsaspekt forventes det at studenten kan redegjøre for forhandlingsdiplomati, politisk propaganda, økonomiske virkemidler, fordekte aksjoner og militær maktbruk. Oppgave 2 Realister og rasjonalister hevder internasjonal politikk er anarkisk strukturert. Hva innebærer dette? Utover dette kan det skilles mellom (i hvert fall) tre strukturelle trekk - internasjonale maktstrukturer, internasjonale regimer/normer og egenskaper ved den internasjonale arbeidsdeling. Redegjør for minst to av disse strukturene, og drøft hvordan disse strukturene kan påvirke samhandlingen mellom stater. Eksemplifiser. Struktur er systemiske rammebetingelser som påvirker samhandlingen i internasjonal politikk (IP). I studiet av IP tar realister og rasjonalister utgangspunkt i at samhandlingsstrukturen er anarkisk. I dette ligger ingen kaosforutsetning, men snarere at samhandlingen i IP er uregulert som følge av at det ikke finnes en overstatlig myndighet. Statene oppfattes som suverene og samarbeid er således basert på frivillighet. 2

3 Et anarkisk statssystem er preget av mangelen på faste over- og underordningsforhold. Over- og underordning er like flukterende som fordelingen av makt mellom stater. Men den til enhver tid rådene maktfordeling (maktstruktur) vil påvirke samhandlingen mellom stater. Realistene har levert det fremste bidraget til å forstå hvordan maktstrukturer påvirker samhandlingen mellom stater gjennom maktbalanseteorien og teorien om hegemonisk stabilitet. Førstnevnte forklarer hvordan krig og fravær av krig er en funksjon av vellykket og forfeilet gjensidig avskrekking. Hegemonisk stabilitetsteori forklarer opprettelsen og opprettholdelsen av internasjonale samarbeidsregimer med forekomsten av en dominerende internasjonal aktør (stat). Liberale institusjonalister har levert viktige bidrag til forståelsen av hvordan internasjonale normstrukturer også kalt internasjonale regimer påvirker samhandlingen i IP generelt, og muligheten for mellomstatelig samarbeid spesielt. Internasjonale regimer representerer regler for samhandling og bidrar til å skape et mer informasjonsrikt, og dermed forutsigelig miljø for statene. Dette kan øke muligheten for samarbeid i et anarki med sterke impulser i retning av maktkamp. Liberale institusjonalister vil se internasjonale normer/regimer som noe mer enn en ren avspeiling av internasjonale maktforhold. De vil innrømme internasjonale regimer en grad av autonomi i å påvirke staters atferd, og dermed samhandlingen mellom stater. Liberale og radikale tilnærminger til studiet av internasjonal politisk økonomi (IPØ) har vist at den økonomiske arbeidsdelingen mellom stater (arbeidsdelingsstrukturen) påvirker samhandlingen mellom stater. Komparativ politikk Oppgave 3 Sodaro argumenterer at holdninger hos den politiske eliten er en viktig forutsetning for demokrati. Hva mener han med det? Illustrer ved å hente eksempler fra to av følgende land: Frankrike, Tyskland, Japan, Storbritannia, Russland eller Kina. Sodero s main point is that elites must embrace the basic values of democracy in order for democracy to succeed (freedom, inclusion, equality, tolerance, welfare, cooperation, compromise trust and others that combine into a spirit of democracy ) and that the attitudes of elites are particularly important in during the construction of democracy. It is the elites who traditionally push or broker the transition to democracy. They must often mobilize support for the compromises that must also be made in such transitions. Once democracy is established, Sodaro argues, it is really the government by elites who are in turn accountable to the people. Elites here means the leaders of key groups throughout society key political and economic leaders, for example, but also military, bureaucracy and so forth. If elites don t support democracy it is unlikely to last. Elites are after all, those with command of resources in a society. Their support, or at least the support of key elites, is essential. They open up the political space within which democracy may evolve perhaps accidently -- or actively 3

4 support the people and the democratic ideal they become allies of the democratic forces in society. France: France s elites have traditionally been less supportive of democracy. The aristocracy was close out of power by absolutist monarchs, and lost power (and often their heads) with outbreak of the French Revolution (although some did support it). The middle class split between those who favored more democracy and those who favored an authoritarian solution. The Church and other elites never accepted the revolution, and continued to support authoritarian solutions. The French road to a stable democracy has accordingly been much more rocky, and France has gone through a series of constitutions. There remain elitist, non-democratic elements in France today. The French President is much more aloof and does not answer to Parliament (although he Prime minister does). The French civil service is also very powerful, closely linked to private enterprise, and its members are not elected. They constitute a true political elite today. The political right in France today supports a strong central state, although Charles degaulle did redefine the right as a supporter of democracy. Today, there is broad support for the current system, but it is one that has clear elitist tendencies. Britain: Britain s slow transition to democracy was driven by elites as well as pressed from below. It started perhaps with the Magna Carta in The British Parliament subsequently came to provide a home for opposition to kings who sought absolute control. Absolutism in Britain was successfully defeated with the English revolution, the overthrow of Charles I and the rule of Oliver Cromwell. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 and associated events led to the supremacy of Parliament and eventual creation of a constitutional monarchy. While this meant that an absolute monarchy did not develop, a transition to democracy was slow, taking place over many years as the House of Commons grew in importance and came to overshadow the House of Lords. Throughout this process, elites clashed with each other, with important elements of the elite supporting transitions in an increasingly democratic direction. Japan: Japanese elites were key figures, of course, in the support the non-democratic regimes of Japan before WWII and in embracing the new, democratic form of government after world war II. Democracy was not a Japanese tradition. The country was ruled by feudal-like lords until the Mejii Resoration of 1868 which set the country on the road to modernity. It is in this period that the close cooperation between the Japanese state and large business conglomerate known as Zaibatsu were formed. Together the state and these businesses formed a barrier to the development of democracy. However, some elites became intrigued by the idea of democracy, formed parties and pushed for change. In 1889 Japan s first constitution was took effect. This was a promising opening for the development of democracy. This opening led to instability as workers and others took advantage of the new system to protest and press demands. In the interwar period, and important backlash developed among powerful elites which ended in the militarization of the government. In 1936 a military coup took place and the military ruled until the defeat of Japan in The military was discredited with Japan s defeat. The American occupation government created a new government for the country, and purged many of the old leaders from the government. A 4

5 new Japanese set of leaders were drawn from outside the old set of leaders, especially from business. Together they forged a new system which was democratic but which was also dominated by a few parties, especially the Liberal Democratic Party, that managed to dominate Japanese politics until recently. Germany: Germany as a single country was a relatively late creation in Europe. In 1848, German liberals tried to create a unified German democracy, but had no success in attracting significant German elites to the project, which collapsed. German intellectual elites embraced much more elitist ideals than liberals in, for example, Britain. The commercial classes, often the source of democratizing ideals, was much weaker than n Britain. The unification of Germany came in an age of nationalism, when the individual was to be subordinate to the state. The state was forged by military force with Prussia as a dominant force: here democratic ideals did not flourish. Some democratic like elements of the German state after 1871 were introduced by Bismarck to divide the liberal opposition, which never gained much traction. The Reichstag did not develop the power of the British parliament. The old regime collapsed as a result of WWI, leaving the weak Weimar Republic which proved unable to establish a stable regime. Elites eventually rallied around Hitler. The Nazis, however, pushed aside old elites. The total defeat of the country at the end of WWII discredited leaders associated with that regime and lead to a new start with a new elite which embraced democratic values. A few prewar leaders who were not tainted by association with the Nazis were given power (Adenauer) and a new generation emerged in the post-war era. Today, German elites support the democratic regime. Russia, somewhat like France, was a country in which the aristocracy became subordinated to an all powerful monarch (here, the Tsar). The Church too was subordinated, to an even greater degree than in France. The military also supported the Tsar. As the 19 th century drew to a close, however, some members of the aristocracy began to press for change and intellectual elite (the intelligentsia) began to call for change. An economic elite really failed to emerge before 1914, and there was little middle class: the Tsar remained the source of privilege and power and little power was devolved to others. There was little successful pressure for change until Russia s defeat by Japan in 1905, when the Tsar was force to create the Duma, a parliament-like institution of very limited power. Russia s system collapsed totally as a result of WWI, leaving a vacuum filled eventually by the communist party. Under this system, a new elite developed who owed its position, wealth and power to a highly undemocratic system. It became very brittle, and when Gorbachev attempted to reform it, the system cracked. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, new elites have emerged, many of whom are not committed to democracy. These are the new Russian oligarchs or tycoons who have amassed great economic power in the country. China: China has no tradition of democracy. The Chinese emperor was an absolute ruler and was supported by a bureaucratic elite. Main challenges tended to come from regional warlords, who asserted their power at times when the Emperor grew weak, but these were not democratizing elements. The west presented a big challenge to China, as its technology and other accomplishments cast doubt upon the supposed superiority of China. The success of the 5

6 western powers created a major debate in China as to the value of western ideas and ways, and the degree to which China should emulate the west, with the development of a movement in favor of democracy. However, the main contenders for power after the collapse of the monarchy were none too democratic the KMT formally embraced democracy but felt the Chinese were not yet ready. Their main competitors were the Communist party which embraced an alternative to western democracy. The dominance of the Communist Party since 1949 has lead to elites who rely upon the Communist Party for their position, although reformers do emerge from their ranks now and then, pushing the system in a less authoritarian direction. Democracy has simply not had many champions in China, although it is possible that this may be slowly changing today. It may be that like in the case of the Soviet Union, elements of the political elite could support reforms that allow a movement for democracy to emerge in the future. Students might note that intellectuals who have criticized the government too forcefully and openly supported western-style democracy have frequently ended up in jail. Oppgave 4 Hva er komparativmetodens hoved logikk i følge Møller? Gi navnet av og beskrive kort to viktige måter av å gjøre en komparativpolitisk studie (forskningsdesign). Gi et eksempel av forskningsdesign av en av teoretiker diskutert av Møller. Møller writes about the Logic of Control or Kontrollogikken. The logic of control lies at the heart of all comparative historical studies. The basic idea is that when comparing cases, the researcher should strive to hold as many background variables constant as possible while varying the independent variable the researcher is focusing on. The point here is that this is necessary to establish causality. The goal in comparative studies is understand why something happens, that is, to establish causal links between an independent and a dependent variable or variables. Møller does recognize however, just how difficult this is. In fact, it is not possible to really have this degree of control in the kinds of studies that he is reviewing or we in comparative politics do. Doing a study of social events is usually not like an experiment in a laboratory where the researcher can be in total control. We therefore do this as best we can. This means that if we have a theory (a possible causal explanation for some event) and we want to see whether it is a good explanation, we can use this logic when selecting cases of what are trying to explain. Møller outlines two principal designs, the Most Similar System Design (MSSD) and the Most Different System Design (MDSD), and that is what I am really looking for. In the MSSD, one compares cases (for example, countries) that are as similar as possible in terms of key control factors/factors (these represent possible rival explanations) but which differ with respect to the independent variable the researcher is interested in. In the MDSD, the idea is to select countries that are as different as possible with respect to key control variables but are the same with respect to that independent variable of interest and also the same with respect to the dependent variable. In the lecture, the Method of Difference and the Method of Agreement were presented as the basic logics at work behind these designs. This comes from JS Mill, and Møller does 6

7 mention these in passing. The Method of Agreement is the logic that To be a cause, an independent variable (IV) (X) must present when the dependent variable (DV) (Y) is present. The basic logic of the Method of Difference is: To be a cause, a factor (IV) must be present when the DV is present & must be absent when the DV is absent. His method of concomitant variation was also presented (If X has an impact on Y, they will vary in a regular pattern). It is easy to confuse these methodologies with research designs, and I would give credit for a correct exposition of these as research designs. Møller also mentions many different kinds of individual case studies as identified by Lijpart and Eckstein (whose lists he compares). These include things like atheoretical case studies, interpretive case studies, the crucial case study (least likely/most likely) and the like. Møller writes that such individual case studies can be selected also according to the logic of control. These are all examples of a research design. If the student chooses one of these, the better answer will address how these relate to that control logic. Here it suffices that the student provides a coherent discussion of one theorist s research Design. Student can chose from: Bloch, Diamond, Moore, Skocpol, Bloch, Weber, Tilly, Ertman, Downing, Schumpter, or Møller himself. 7