Radionuklidene kilder til forurensing og virkninger på naturmiljøet

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2 Tsjernobyl-ulykken 30 år etter Ås, 26. april, 2016 Radionuklidene kilder til forurensing og virkninger på naturmiljøet Brit Salbu CERAD CoE for Environmental Radioactivity Department of Environmental Sciences, NMBU

3 Chernobyl 30 yrs Fukushima 5 yrs Some lessons learned Status 1986 Lessons learned Nedbygget kompetanse fra 1970 årene, dårlig utstyr hos «de fleste», få visste hva Bq var, svak rekruttering «Nedlagt» beredskapsorganisasjon Ingen planlagt organisering elle ansvarfordeling Kompetanse må være på plass når vi trenger den Atomberedskap må organiseres før «noe» skjer De fleste prognoser var feil, mangelfulle modeller og data, nasjonalt og internasjonalt: Cs vil bindes til jord, problemet ville være over i løpet av noen mnd Stort behov for tidsserier, kunnskap om underligende mekanismer, prosesser og kinetikk som basis for modellutvikling Nedfallet lignet ikke på bombenedfallet. Kunnskap fra 1960 årene var også gått tapt. Tiltak ikke planlagt. Media drevet tiltak mot Frosta salaten Må forberede oss på nedfall som ikke er likt Tsjernobyl-ulykken Alternative tiltak må utarbeides før de skal i gangsettes

4 Bakteppet årene: Prøvesprengninger ganske omfattende målinger av «mange» 1970 årene: Stans i prøvesprengningene + Granli-utvalget nedstemt - ingen kjernekraft i Norge Helsedirektoratet/Mork nedla Strålehygienisk Råd, mot faglige råd HD stanset tidsserier, mot faglige råd HD «nedla» atomberedskap, overført til SIS, Måleutstyret forfalt (LORAKON 1962) NKS Nordiske strålevernmyndigheters møte februar 1986: «Vi vet nok, trenger ingen eksperimenter, skal kun bruke modeller» Liten internasjonal kontakt Svikt i rekruttering Omlegging fra Curie til Bq 1 µci = Bq Da ble alt mye farligere

5 Nedfall i Norge: april-mai 1986 Ulykke natt til lørdag, oppdaget i Finland (Rn), fastslått i Sverige (Forsmark), viste at det kom fra sør-øst, info til Norge registrert av SIS på mandag Direktør SIS i NRK: Ubetydelig nedfall i Norge (1 målestasjon på taket i Bærum) Helsedirektoratets beredskapsorganisasjon var ikke-fungerende, det utviklet seg til en viss konflikt med SIS NGU i Trondheim måler høyere nivåer enn SIS, utvikling av en nord-sør konflikt, delvis mediadrevet Tiltaksgrenser fra det tyske handelsdep: 300 Bq/kg (mai), endret til 600 Bq/kg (EU) Frosta-salaten hastetiltak bestemt av Helsedirektoratet basert på pressekonferanse Rykteflom: «SIS ansatte holder barna hjemme fra barnehaven», «deformerte reinsdyrkalver», «fosterskader» + fysikerne på Blindern Helsedir nedsatte i 14. mai Oftedal-utvalget NOU1987:1 Vi fikk endeløst med spørsmål fra publikum

6 NOU:1986 (1) «I de første ukene etter Tsjernobyl-ulykken var nedfalls-situasjonen uklar i Norge mhp hvilke områder som var mest berørt, hvilke institusjoner og myndigheter som skulle bidra med målinger, hvorledes de fremlagte måledata skulle tolkes ut fra anvendt instrumentering og referanseramme, og i hvilken form og gjennom hvilke kanaler forholdene skulle meddeles og kommenteres fra offentligheten» Måle-situasjonen bedret utover høsten (SIS, DN etc. NLH (jord)) Krise oppsto ved høstslakting - kassasjon Hernes-utvalget (høst 2016) : Informasjonskrise Oftedal- utvalget (mai 1986): Kunnskapskrise

7 Nedfall I Skandinavia fra Tsjernobyl ulykken 1986 Kalibreringsproblem mellom Norge og Sverige Kart: 4 prøver/kommune Partikkelnedfall, uran partikler Fraksjonering av regnvann i Oslo. Partikkel andel 75 % av Cs isotoper 50 % av I % av lantanider, Zr Countermeasures still needed Brit Salbu, Isotope Laboratory, IPM

8 CERAD/MET Reconstruction I-131

9 CERAD/MET Reconstruction Cs-isotopes

10 Nasjonal kompetanse Relativ Kompetanse CERAD Prøvesprengninger Chernobyl Fukushima

11 Vision of CERAD CoE To provide new scientific knowledge and tools for better protection of humans and the environment from harmful effects of radiation Essence: To significantly reduce the overall uncertainties in impact and risk assessments associated with radiation (ionizing + UV), also combined with other stressors From sources to risks Focus: sources, transfer, effects, risks (SRA 2013) Focus directed toward 8 Umbrella research priority areas (SRA 2016) CERAD Motivation In short: Personnel: about 80 part time positions, about 50 scientists Many sources can contribute to releases of radioactivity in the Funding: about 4 MEuro/yr, about 50 % In kind future. Competence must be available when needed. PostDocs Science/New PhD knowledge - MSc: 6 (5+7) to cover (17 key + 5) knowledge gaps Publications: Recruitment about needed 80 also in 3 yrs internationally Int Science presentations: must underpin about the risk per management yr to maintain public trust. SAC (10 scientists) + RAC (5 authorities/ministries/directorates) Ionising radiation +? DNA Damage NMBU (3 faculties) and NRPA with support from MET, NIVA, NIPH Funded by the Research Council of Norway ( )

12 Scientific concept Naturally occurring and man-made radionuclides Development of an ecosystem based scientific approach to help protect people and the environment from ionizing radiation requires a programme of targeted focused long term research on: Source terms and release scenarios, Ecosystem transfer, Biological responses, and Impact and risk assessments Endrede konsepter: 2000: Strålevernloven- Beskyttelse av både mennesker og miljø 2011: Endring i forskriftene for Forurensningsloven Radioaktive stoffer anses være miljøgift Basic science in RA 1-3 will form the basis of improved impact and risk assessment.

13 UMBRELLA research focus areas To reduce uncertainties in impact and risk assessments UMB1: Linking particle characteristics to sources and effects UMB2: Dynamic ecosystem transfer time functions to replace constants UMB3: Radiosensitivity - Why are some organisms more sensitive than others? UMB4: Combined Toxicity and Cumulative Risk- additive/synergism/antagonism UMB5: Transgenerational effects - reproduction and epigenetics UMB6: Ecosystem approach U field exp/ micro/mesocosms UMB7: UV - ionising radiation and dosimetry exposure mechanisms UMB8: Case studies: Hypothetical nuclear accidents and deposition in Norway Case: Sources in UK Case Russian sunken submarines in the Arctic Potential impact for man and the environment, economy and society Advisor to the National Crisis Committee

14 A series of nuclear sources in Europe can potentially release radioactive particles in the future B. Salbu, KJM 351, 2007

15 Key factors to address in order to reduce uncertainties Objectives: Reduce uncertainties for the most sensitive parameters in models through focused research Kilde transport nedfall økosystem transport opptak effekt danner basis for konsekvensvurderinger From sources to risks Helse Miljø Økonomi Samfunn Etikk Ionising radiation +? Local/Regional Kd, Kw-doc Include colloidal transport Regional parameters: Relevant growth periods Animal parameters, Tag Human habits Uptake from soil DNA Damage All UMBRELLAS should contribute to better predictions

16 Kildeterm input til alle modeller Hva vil et nytt utslipp inneholde? Er det gass, enkle ioner eller partikler Vi må lære av tidligere hendelser!

17 Kildeterm: basert på historiske hendelser Nuclear sources have contributed to releases of radioactive particles Red: NMBU archive Nuclear weapon tests (Kazakhstan) Conventional detonation of weapons (Greenland, Spain) Nuclear reactor explosions and fires (Ukraine, UK, Canada) Accidents with reactor driven vehicles: satellites, submarine accidents (Norway - Russia) Effluents from nuclear installations (UK, France, USA, Russia) Leaching from dumped nuclear material (Kara Sea) Uranium mining and tailing (Central Asia, Norway) Use of DU ammunition (Kuwait, Kosovo) History shows that in all severe nuclear events a series of radionuclides/metals are released as particles, from submicrons to fragments

18 Radioactive particles released during all types of severe nuclear events. Essential to implement particle codes in source term and transport models Nuclear test Semipalatinsk Particle deposition Dounrey Sellafield Characteristics depend on source and release scenario Hot spots problems with representative sampling Partial leaching analytical errors May underestimate the inventories Kuwait Adds significantly to the overall uncertainties Aggregate from the Chernobyl explosion XRMA Thule Corrosion product Waste in Kara Sea DEPARTMENT OF PLANT- AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES Th in NORM, Norway

19 Advanced techniques for particle characterization state-of-the-art (access to international platforms) Hot spots/heterogeneities: digital autoradiography and sample splitting - gamma measurements Particle size, surface structure and elemental composition: ESEM with XRMA, TEM with XRMA Subsurface/volume elemental composition: SR-based 2D µ-xrf (fluorescens) Oxidation state determination: SR-based 2D µ-xanes (micro X-ray absorption near edge structure spectrometry Crystallographic structure: SR-based µ-xrd (micro X-ray diffraction) 3D elemental distribution: Confocal µ-xrf, TOF-SIMS 3D structure distribution: Tomographic µ-xrd, nano-ct Source identification: Nuclear forensic Isotope or atom ratios by MS techniques (ICP-MS, AMS) Weathering rates and mobilisation potential: Leaching experiments (e.g., using GI liquids)

20 Case: Partikler fra undergrunn prøvesprengninger, Semipalatinsk vha synkrotron stråle teknikker (ESRF) Red-dense: Pu+ U Light yellow/ less dense: jord hollows Single absorption tomogram through spherical particle

21 Case: Partikkel fra Fen, naturlig forekommende radioactive stoffer (Th + U) sammen med tungmetaller Objectives: Obtain particle characteristics of importance for assessing env. impact at Lind et al contaminated areas Methods: ESEM-EDX, nano-ct, synchrotron 2D/3D µ-xanes/µ-xrf/µ-xrd Nano-CT NanoCT Nano-CT µ-xrf/µ-xrd virtual slice Conclusions: Particle characterisation should be implemented in impact assessments

22 Radioaktive kolloider i utslipp fra reprosseseringsanlegg (Sellafield, La Hague) vha transmission electron microscopy (TEM). Effluents contain: ions, colloids, particles, Pu associated with colloids SIXEP La Hague SEATANK Sellafield 200nm

23 Transport Fra kilde til nedfall i Norge: Hvor sannsynlig er det? Case: Sellafield, UK via luft og havstrømmer Case: Russiske u-båter i nord Case: Chernobyl Alternativt: Sårbart område i Norge Hvor kan kilder komme fra?

24 From Sellafield to Norway: Worst case meteorological scenario H. Klein and J. Bartnicki (MET) Objectives: Estimate the probability of reaching Norway by radioactive cloud released from a hypothetical accident in Sellafield. Selection of worst case meteorological scenario. Sellafield Norway Methods: Use of 33-year historical meteorological database for running the dispersion SNAP model for the source term in Sellafield. Scientific output: Statistical long-term analysis of atmospheric transport Identification of the worst case meteorological scenario Deposition maps and probability maps Analysis and maps of transport time to Norway Input data for other models (marine, environmental) Deposition of 137 Cs (Bq m -2 ) worst case meteological condition Conclusions: Probability of reaching Norway from hypothetical Sellafield accident is relatively high (up to 40%) and transport time short. Worst meteorological situation in April 1994.

25 From K-27 submarine to Norway. Worst case scenario J. Bartnicki, I. Amundsen, J Brown, A. Hosseini, Ø. Hov, H. Haakenstad, H. Klein, O.C. Lind, B. Salbu, C.C. Szacinski Wendel, M.A. Ytre -Eide Objectives: Estimate the probability of reaching Norway by radioactive cloud from a hypothetical accident on K-27 submarine in Gremikha bay - Russia. Selection of worst case meteorological scenario. K27 Norway Methods: Use of 33-year historical meteorological database for running the dispersion SNAP model for the source term in K-27. Scientific output: Statistical long-term analysis of atmospheric transport Identification of the worst case meteorological scenario Deposition maps and probability maps Analysis and maps of transport time to Norway Input data for other models (marine, environmental) Paper published in Journal of Environmental Radioactivity Deposition of Cs-137 (Bq m -2 ) worst case meteo Conclusions: Probability of reaching Norway from hypothetical K-27 accident 15-25% for N Norway and below 35% for S Norway, but transport time very short (<9hrs). Worst meteorological situation in September 2004.

26 Case: Comparison of K-27 and Sellafield probabilities reaching Norway J. Bartnicki, I. Amundsen, J Brown, A. Hosseini, Ø. Hov, H. Haakenstad, H. Klein, O.C. Lind, B. Salbu, C.C. Szacinski Wendel, M.A. Ytre -Eide Objectives: Estimate the probability of reaching Norway by radioactive cloud from a hypothetical accident on K-27 submarine in Gremikha bay Russia and Sellafield, UK. Methods: Use of 33-year historical meteorological database for running the dispersion SNAP model for the source term in K-27 and Sellafield. K-27 Sellafield Conclusions: Probability of reaching Norway from hypothetical K-27 accident is lower than from the Sellafield accident, but the transport time is shorter. Climatological wind pattern is very important.

27 Case: Reconstruction from deposition to a source Wendel Objectives: et al (NMBU, Determine FFI, MET) origin and transport route of a radioactive cloud that reached Norway in November 1962 Methods: Advanced mass spectrometric methods (AMS) in combination with atmospheric dispersion modelling (HYSPLIT and SNAP) Particles in air filters, october 1962, Norwaty Scientific output: 240 Pu/ 239 Pu and 236 U/ 239 Pu atom ratios in filter were low - reflected a nuclear weapon low yield source Date and real time meteorology: reflect Semipalatinsk test site (STS) as origin 241 Pu/ 239 Pu activity ratio 10,00 1,00 0,10 Global weapons fallout (Kelley et al., 1999) Weapon grade Civil source 0,01 0,00 0,10 0,20 0,30 0,40 0,50 0,60 0, Pu/ 239 Pu atom ratio Conclusions: First strong indication that debris from STS was transported to Europe and Norway

28 SNAP Reconstruction fits well to deposition in air filters Klein et al (MET, NMBU)

29 Case: Worst Place Scenarios for Nuclear Accidents in the Northern Objectives: Marine Environment focus Lofoten Strand et al (NRPA) Establish which potential accident locations in the northern seas will have the most impact on seawater concentrations in Lofoten, essential for fish Maps of the sensitivity of the target area within six months of a surface release Methods: 3D hydrodynamic oceanographic model (NAOSIM). Developed an adjoint of that model to determine the sensitivity of the output to the geographical location of the input Conclusions: Lofoten is more vulnerable to nuclear accidents occurring over a wider geographic area than previously anticipated. Possible to assess relatively rapidly, in advance, individual transports of radioactive material

30 Ecosystem transfer Vann - jord - planter - dyr - mennesker Modellene i dag er basert på konstante overføringsfaktorer under likevekt (IAEA Handbook) Kd = fra vann til jord: Bq/kg i jord per Bq/L vann) TF = fra jord til planter: Bq/kg planter/ Bq/kg jord) TC= fra fôr til dyr: Bq/kg dyr/ Bq/kg inntak per dag) Tagg: fra jord til dyr Problem: Overføringsfaktorene er avhengig av klimaforhold og endrer seg over tid!

31 The speciation of radionuclides influences ecosystem transfer, biological uptake and effects Impact and Risks Biological effects Biological uptake Skin dose Inhalation LMM species Mobile and bioavailable species f(t) Colloids/ nanoparticles f(t) Particles Source Bulk activity concentration (Bq/kg) provides no info on processes affecting radionuclide species

32 Source term - radionuclide speciation: The system is dynamic, and transformation processes will influence the size distribution of radionuclide species f (t) Molecular mass growth mechanisms: hydrolysis complexation polymerisation colloid formation aggregation Potential mobile and bioavailable species Mobilization mechanisms: desorption dissolution dispersion Inert, retained in soils and sediments

33 Case: Binding av Pu til sediment er avhengig av tilstandsformen til Pu. Pu(III,IV) er partikkelreaktiv høy Kd Pu(III,IV)-organic and Pu(V,VI) er mobile lav K Kd for Pu: vary orders of magnitude Kd er ikke en konstant

34 Case: Chernobyl soils containing particles Sequential Extraction of Cs-137 and stable Cs in soils Brit Salbu, UMB, Bergen June 2008 Weathering predict decreased mobility and decreased doses 137 Cs Stable Cs

35 Source: Chernobyl soils containing particles Sequential Extraction of Sr-90 and stable Sr Weathering predict increased mobility and increased doses 90 Sr Stable Sr Oughton et al., Analyst 1992

36 CASE: The Chernobyl accident: 3-4 tons of fuel released Explosion no oxygen High temp and pressure oxidation state +2.5± Same source 90 Weathering rates Different release scenarios Fire oxygen High temp, normal prressure oxidation state +4 ± Different particle characteristics WEST Different ecosystem behaviour 10 0 NORTH Initial explosion Subsequent fire oxidation state +5±0.5 West North Slow weathering rate Delayed ecosystem transfer Rapid weathering rate Rapid ecosystem transfer

37 Case: Cs-137 i reinsdyr ( ) Skuterud et al (NRPA) Contrasting years: Extreme fungi: mean 3,400 Bq/kg No fungi: mean 630 Bq/kg 137 Cs concentration, Bq/kg Transfer to reindeer økologisk halveringstid: Kort tid etter nedfall halveringstid ca 2 år Midt på 1990 tallet halveringstiden er økt 2014: halveringstid ca 25 år Konklusjon; TF endres over tid NMBU+ NINA: Passive dosimeters for GPS labelled wild life: Reindeer: 16 Moose: 21 Bear: 9

38 Effect of feed to cow on iodine levels in milk I tracer experiment to fistulated cow also relevant to human health In collaboration with E. Prestløkken, K. Hove, K. Sivertsen Storli Objective: Develop/refine the biokinetic model of 131 I in cows fed with or without rapeseed. Why is rapseed decreasing the I level in milk? Method: The tracer was either administrated to the vein of 4 fistulated cows as 131 I - and as 131 IO 3 via rumen of fistulated cows acute dose. ccpmkg -1 Milk 4000 * * Rapseed Soy hrs Milk/plasma 131 I ratio % of dose Urine vein injection t b1/2 fast: 7.2 hrs t b1/2 slow: 3.2 days hrs Bq/cm Thyroid Shoulder 0, Hours Conclusion: Rapeseed in the diet significantly reduced transfer of 131 I to milk. Today: I in milk has decrease about 50 % due to diet, essential for preparedness purposes and for the public heath status Increasing rapeseed in diet up to 90 % of 131 I could be removed from milk as a countermeasure in an emergency situation

39 Opptak, akkumulering, effekt Opptaksmekanismer: Hvilke kjemiske former tas opp fra vann eller jord? Vannkvalitet påvirker opptak, diett påvirker opptak Akkumulering hvor lagres stoffene? Utskillingshastighet (biologisk halveringstid) Hvilke effekter: molekylært nivå, celler organer individerpopulasjon- økosystem? Sensitive livsstadier? Transgenerasjonelle effekter? Blanding av stoffer vi er alltid utsatt for cocktails?

40 Cerad Radiosensitivity Toolbox Dag Brede Objectives: Systematic investigation of interspecies differences in sensitivity to harmful effects of gamma radiation. Establish standardized set of Biological Effect Endpoints for interspecies comparison. Standardized exposure set up, both dose rates and dosimetry. Interspecies comparison of dose rates and total doses that produce EC10 or EC50. Identify molecular processes and gene regulatory responses that determine radiosensitivity.

41 CASE: Uranium model experiments with Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar L.) juveniles (Teien et al) Objectives: Evaluate bioavailability and toxicity of U towards fish, the influence of competing cations and interaction of Cd. Methods: 1430 Atlantic Salmon juveniles parr were exposed (96h) to depleted uranium (DU) in controlled experiments (OECD, 1992). Speciation, uptake (gill, liver and kidney) and induced toxicity of U (blood physiological changes, mortality) as a function of varying water concentrations of H +, Ca 2+, Mg 2+, Na +,K + and Cd as well as U were studied based on US EPA very soft water (US EPA, 2002). Toxic mechanisms in exposed juveniles were explored using Microarray gene expression profiling of gills. Conclusions: ph and U speciation are key factors influencing the U bioavailability; Tthe U uptake in tissues correlated with U toxicity, U reduced the uptake and toxicity of Cd. Findings highlight the importance of understand underlying mechanisms in toxicity and mixture studies. 8 <1 nm U 4 µm U 8 µm U Water Cd (nm) D) 150 Blood plasma Cl (mm) Liver-Cd (nmol/g) U-Gill (µmol/g dw) Down regulated genes GO functions identifid: Cell cycle regulation DNA replication Response to ROS mitochondrial electron trans sodium ion transport

42 Case: Gamma radiation and U model experiment Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) developing embryos Teien et al (NMBU, NRPA, Cigene) Objectives: To identify effects of gamma radiation and uranium in Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar L.) embryos Methods: 90 days exposure of embryos (OECD, 2013) to gamma radiation ( 60 Co, 0.4 to 40 mgy/h) and/or depleted uranium ( µg U/L) in controlled experiments, from fertilization until hatching. The effect endpoints were development, time of hatching and mortality. Toxic mechanisms in exposed embryos were explored using RNA-Seq gene expression profiling after 28 days of exposure (164 day degree). Top conical pathways Top conical pathways Conclusions: Gamma dose rates between mgy/h are critical for embryonal development of Atlantic salmon Gastrula is the most sensitive stage of embryogenesis The embryo developing stage seems more sensitive towards U than the juvenile stage.

43 A multigenerational study of zebrafish irradiated with lowdose gamma radiation Hurem et al (NMBU/Basam + IMV) Objectives: Multigenerational inheritance using zebrafish model: phenotypic endpoints including reproduction, malformations mortality, oxidative stress/ros, DNA damage, genome wide gene expression and epigenetic landscapes, bioinformatics and predicted biological function analysis Results: 100 % mortality (gastrula) in all F0-40 mgy/h (31 Gy) offspring (F1) DNA damage in gamma irradiated F0 (10 mgy/h; 4 Gy) offspring (F1) Retinal morphology altered in gamma irradiated F0 (10 mgy/h; 4 Gy) offspring (F1) Dose-response effect on gene expression in embryos exposed to gamma: between 2.5 and 5.5hpf with mgy/h ( mgy) Effect on epigenetic landscapes histone PTM marks in embryos (F0) at 10 mgy/h (30 mgy) and offspring (F1) of parental generation exposed for 10 mgy during gametogenesis (4Gy) Preliminary results indicate effects on 5mC and 5hmC in testis after 10 mgy/ h during gametogenesis (4 Gy) From exposure to risks Ionising radiation +? DNA Damage and epigemetics

44 Gamma exposure of male mice fed normal or low Se diets relevance for human health In collaboration with NIPH Objectives: Identify if Se as antioxidant could reduce effects induced from gamma radiation (free radicals, recombination and production of ROS) Methods: A mouse experiment involving 128 F0 male mice divided into 8 different groups, receiving 1.48 mgy/h for 45 days, +/- Se depletion through two generations, mated with unexposed females to give offspring (F1-F2). Enriched Se wheat in diets were grown at NMBU Results The gamma exposure given was indeed genotoxic, and Se modulate the response. Low Se are reprotoxic (Low Se = sterile offspring), and more severe effects when male mice were exposed to gamma Effects on male germ cells (testicular cells + sperm) inducing DNA lesions by gamma Changes in genome wide gene expression was demonstrated in testis following both gamma and low Se Epigenetic regulation (DNA methylation) of transposable repeat elements and imprinted genes in sperm were not changed by gamma or low Se + + =? Norway low in Se intake, Se in serum reduced about 40 % since mid 1990ies

45 Impact from nm - µm sized particles Fertilization of salmon eggs in the presence of UO 2 and U 3 O 8 nanoparticles Dose is unevenly distributed Both cases: severe skin doses unevenly distributed Microdosimetry challenge Radioactive particles retained in goats, incorporated in GI tissues Egg mortality compared to control Development: Slightly later onset of hatching, and the hatching peak period was delayed in NanoUO 2 severe ecological relevance. Dounrey particles given to Blue Mussels as food, retained in the gut and deposited in tissues

46 ESRF News July 2015 Beauty of science: Nanoparticle uptake in nematodes NMBU/CERD embryo embryo CoNP CoNP Co NP (5-10 nm) given to synchronized C.elegans (1 mm). Internal distribution: CT, 2D XRF tomography at the ESRF ID16A synchrotron beamline. Endpoint: Reproduction failure at the highest concentrations First time 2 and 3D distribution of NPs are imaged in an intact (50x1000 µm) organism at 30 nanometer resolution

47 CERAD objective: To focus on factors contributing the most to the overall uncertainties in impact and risk Case: Nuclear accidents in UK deposition at west coast of Norway assessments Methods: 1) Combining models from source to risk 2) Sensitivity analysis: variables contribute most to uncertainty? 3) Research priorities General meteorological uncertainty Better parameterization of wet and dry deposition Replace constants (e.g. Kd, CF) with dynamic funtions Local parameters: sediment porosity, SPM etc. From sources to risks Economic value of a change in a particular (local) ecosystem service, e.g. salmon angling Ionising radiation +? Local/Regional Kd, Kw-doc Include colloidal transport Regional parameters: Relevant growth periods Animal biokinetics, Tag Human diets/habits Uptake from soil DNA Damage Integrating research from all umbrellas prognosis and uncertainty estimates

48 CERAD Education and training Lindis Objectives: Skipperud, To internationalize Brit Salbu education Methods: Intensive courses - Make courses available for international students Bologna model Academic merited Research based education High quality lecturers and supervisors from European + North America Universities, Institutes and Authorities - Experts giving lectures Education platform Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) University Aix Marseille, France Moscow State University, Russia CINCH-II partners (Radiochemistry) National University of Life and Environmental Sciences of Ukraine University of Fukushima Tomsk Polytechnical University, Russia Chalk River, Canada to be signed

49 International activity ICRP (international Commission on Radiological Protection) CERAD MG is represented on two ICRP committees UNSCEAR (United Nations Scientific Committee on the effects of atomic radiation) Fukushima-Daiichi environmental impact assessment UN White paper IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) Co-ordinating work on the consequences of Fukushima - IAEA Report Chair Coordinated Research Project on Radioactive particles ( ) NATO - involvement in NATO Science for Peace and Security programs for many years IUR (International Union of Radioecology) 3 task Groups, esp Ecosystem approach 4 th IUR Vernadsky award 2014 Member of the ALLIANCE and NERIS platforms, Concert JEP EU funded research: STAR, COMET, RATE, DoReMi, PREPARE, CONCERT EJP, ERICA Tool Consortium, Nanoparticle research Central Asia - Uzbekistan NKS (Nordic Nuclear Safety Research) Joint Norwegian Russian Environment Commission Arctic Council/AMAP Field work/visits 2015: Poland, Palomares in Spain, Canada, Semipalatinsk 2016: Chernoby, Fukushima, Fen

50 Tsjernobyl start på omfattende Norsk- Russisk samarbeid 1990 Ukraina + Hviterussland + Russland 1991 Norsk - Russisk samarbeid , 2014 Felles tokt i Kara havet Atomhandlingsplanen Mayak PA Kola: Andeeva + Lepse + u-båter Tokt Ob + Yenisey Kursk Krasnoyarsk K-159 Tokt 2015 Forsknings og univisningssamarbeid Moskva State Univ (MoU) Tomsk Polytech University (MoU) Kiev University Fukushima University

51 Challenges: Future nuclear or radiological events Paradigm shifts in risk evaluation: Three Mile Island, USA, 1979, low probability severe accidents can occur Chernobyl,USSR, 1986, consequences can be far more severe than expected, far outside the 30 km zone 2011 Fukushima - geohazards are underestimated. World Trade Center and Pentagon, USA, 2001, group are capable to induce harm new worst case scenario estimates Unforseen acts Attack at installations Dirty bombs Silent killers Contamination of food/water supplies Risk is probably higher than previously assessed

52 Take home messages Det er mange kilder der ute kompetanse må være til sted når vi trenger den Vi må ha god kunnskap om hele kjeden: Kilder og hva kan slippes ut partikler i nedfall transport i ulike økosystem opptak og akkumulering i organismer direkte effekter på sårbare livsstadier og transgenerasjonseffekter Reminder: Predictions are only valid within the boundaries of the overall uncertainties Fremdeles mange kunnskapshull: CERAD forskning: Predictions Fokus på faktorer are only som bidrar relevant til usikkerhet when i konsekvensvurderinger uncertainties are estimated, Kopling av communicated eksponering (kjemi) og and respons understood (biologi) krever avansert teknologi, og tilgang til plattformer internasjonalt Grunnleggende kunnskap danner basis for god beredskap Må sikre at kunnskap vedlikeholdes og videreutvikles

53 Questions??? Brit Salbu, UMB, Ankara, November, 2011 Foto: UMBs fotoarkiv

54 IAEA Revised: Threat categories T h r e a t category Accidental releases from different sources Consequences O Nuclear weapons Enormous I II III IV V Reactors without containment: old reactors, Chernobyl type reactors Reactor driven ships, spent fuel storage (criticality accidents) Satellite accidents, Waste disposal sites, RTGs (15 PBq Sr-90). Radiation facilities at hospitals Dirty bombs, lost sources Transport of radioactive materials E u r o p e a n p o w e r r e a c t o r s w i t h containments Deterministic effects far outside the site Deterministic effects locally, serious health and environmental effects regionally Deterministic effects locally, serious to moderate health and environmental effects regionally Serious to moderate health and environmental effects locally Moderate to insignificant