Instructions for the base (B)-treatment and the elicitation (E)-treatment of the experiment

Transkript

1 Appendix Instructions for the base (B)-treatment and the elicitation (E)-treatment of the experiment We here provide the instructions given to the participants at the beginning of the session and throughout the experiment. We present both the original instructions in Norwegian and the English translations. Part A contains the instructions presented to the participants at the beginning of the experiment. [Information given in brackets applies only to the E-treatment.] Part B presents the interactive screen shots (with examples of possible parameter values and choices) that guided the participants through the B-treatment and E-treatment of the experiment. Part A: Instructions read to the participants at the beginning of the experiment (in Norwegian) Takk for at du vil delta i dette eksperimentet. Eksperimentet foregår på individuelle pc er og er designet slik at alle deltakerne sikres anonymitet. Eksperimentet du skal delta i har to [tre] faser [en spørrefase,] en produksjonsfase og en fordelingsfase. [I spørrefasen vil du få presentert tre ulike oppfatninger av hva som er en rettferdig fordeling. Du får også presentert tre eksempler på hva disse prinsippene impliserer i konkrete situasjoner, og du vil bli bedt om å krysse av for det prinsippet som du synes gir den mest rettferdige fordelingen i denne typen situasjoner.] Produksjonsfasen starter med at du får tildelt 300 kroner. Disse pengene kan du velge å investere i to spill. For hvert spill kan du investere enten 0 kroner, 100 kroner eller 200 kroner. Summen av investeringene i de to spillene kan ikke overstige de 300 kronene du har fått utdelt. Pengene som du investerer vil enten bli fordoblet eller firedoblet avhengig av om du har lavt eller høyt talent. Talent blir tildelt tilfeldig av datamaskinen og er det samme i begge spillene. En person som er tildelt høyt talent og som investerer 200 kroner i et spill vil produsere 800 kroner, mens en person som er tildelt lavt talent og som investerer det samme vil produsere 400 kroner. I et av spillene har din medspiller samme talent som du. I det andre spillet har dere ulikt talent. I fordelingsfasen vil du for hvert av de to spillene bli koblet sammen med en tilfeldig valgt medspiller. Du vil ikke kunne finne ut hvem din medspiller er, men du vil få opplysninger om hvor mye din medspiller har investert, hvilket talent vedkommende har og hvor mye vedkommende har produsert. Medspilleren du kobles sammen med kan være forskjellig fra deg både med hensyn til investeringsnivå og talent. For eksempel kan en spiller med høyt talent som har investert 200 kroner kobles sammen med en spiller med lavt talent som har investert 100 kroner. For hvert av de to spillene skal du A-1

2 bestemme hvordan den samlede produksjonen skal fordeles mellom deg og din medspiller. Du skal med andre ord oppgi hvordan du vil fordele pengene dersom du får bestemme fordelingen alene. I eksemplet ovenfor vil spillernes bidrag til den samlede produksjonen bli henholdsvis 800 kroner og 200 kroner. Hver av de to spillerne skal dermed oppgi hvordan de ønsker at 1000 kroner skal deles dem imellom. Ditt forslag til fordeling vil bli iverksatt for bare et av de to spillene. I det andre spillet vil din medspiller sitt forslag til fordeling bli iverksatt. Datamaskinen vil trekke tilfeldig hvem som skal foreslå fordeling i hvert spill. A-2

3 Part A: Instructions read to the participants at the beginning of the experiment (translated into English) We appreciate that you are willing to participate in this experiment. The experiment will be carried out on computers and the design of the experiment protects the anonymity of all the participants. The experiment you will take part in has two [three] phases [a question phase,] a production phase and a distribution phase. [In the question phase, three different principles of what constitutes a fair distribution of income will be presented. Three examples of the implication of these principles in real distribution situations will also be presented, before you will be asked to tick off the principle you consider the fairest in these kinds of distributive situations.] In the production phase, you will be given an endowment of 300 NOK, which you can invest in two games. In each game you can invest 0 NOK, 100 NOK or 200 NOK. However, the investment in the two games can not exceed the endowment of 300 NOK. Your investment will be doubled or quadrupled depending on whether you are assigned a low or high talent. The computer will pick your talent randomly, and you have the same talent in both games. A high talented person who invests 200 NOK in a game, will produce 800 NOK, while a low talented person who invests the same amount, will produce 400 NOK. In one of the two games your co-player has the same talent as you, while in the other the co-player has a different talent. In the distribution phase, the computer will randomly pick your co-player for each of the two games, and you will not be able to reveal the identity of your co-player. However, you will be given information about your cp-player s talent, investment and production. Your co-player can be different from you regarding both talent and investment level. A player with high talent who has invested 200 NOK may, for example, be chosen by the computer to play with a low talented player who has invested 100 NOK. For each of the two games you must decide how you want to divide the joint production between yourself and your co-player. In the example above, the contributions of the two players to the joint production are 800 NOK and 200 NOK, respectively. Accordingly, each of the two players must decide how to distribute 1000 NOK between them. However, your proposal will be implemented for only one of the two games. In the other game the proposal of your co-player will be implemented. The proposer for each game will be chosen randomly by the computer. A-3

4 Part B: Interactive screen shots guiding the participants throughout the B-treatment of the experiment (in Norwegian). A-4

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11 Part B: Interactive screen shots guiding the participants throughout the B-treatment of the experiment (translated into English) Step 1/6 Information Your participation number 3 Your talent 2 Production phase You have three possible investment choices in each game, and you have a total of 300 NOK to invest. NOK 0 NOK 100 NOK 200 Your choice of investment Game 1 Game 2 o NOK 0 o NOK 0 o NOK 100 o NOK 100 o NOK 200 o NOK 200 Move on Continue A-11

12 Step 2/6 Information Your participation number 3 Your talent 2 Investment decision stored Game 1 Game 2 Your choice of investment Instruction Please wait until the session administrator asks you to continue. Do not push the button Continue before you are asked to do so Move on Continue A-12

13 Step 3/6 Information Your participation number 3 Game 1 Production Your talent 3 Your investment decision 100 Your production 200 Your co-player s talent 2 Your co-player s investment decision 100 Your co-player s production 200 Total production 400 Distribution Your proposal for the distribution of 400 NOK: For you NOK. For your co-player NOK.. Game 2 Production Your talent 3 Your investment decision 200 Your production 400 Your co-player s talent 2 Your co-player s investment decision 100 Your co-player s production 400 Total production 800 Distribution Your proposal for the distribution of 800 NOK: For you NOK. For your co-player NOK.. Move on Continue A-13

14 Step 4/6 Information Your participation number 3 Your talent 2 Instruction Please wait until the session administrator asks you to continue. Do not push the button Continue before you are asked to do so. Move on Continue A-14

15 Step 5/6 Information Your participation number 3 Your talent 2 Payment You will only get the pay-off from one of the two games. You will get the pay-off from game 1. Total production in this game was 400. Your co-player s proposal for distribution was chosen, and you pay-off is 300. Your payment will be 300 (your pay-off) + 0 (amount not invested) Your payment code is Needed information In order to transfer the total payment to you, your name, address and account number is needed. This information will only be sent to the Accounting Division, and will not be made available for the researchers responsible for the experiment. Name Last name First name Address Post/Street address Post code Town/City Account number 11 digits Payment 300 Payment code Send the information to the Accounting Division A-15

16 Step 6/6 Information Your participation number 3 Your talent 2 Receipt Your message has been sent. You will receive your payment soon. Payment Name: Last Name First Name Address: Post/Street address, Post code, Town/City Account number: 11 digits Payment: 300 Code: :28:12 End Thank you for your participation in this research experiment. Please remain seated. You may now exit your web browser. A-16

17 Part B: Interactive screen shots guiding the participants throughout the E-treatment of the experiment (in Norwegian) A-17

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28 Part B: Interactive screen shots guiding the participants throughout the E-treatment of the experiment (translated into English) Step 1/7 Information Your participation number 4 Introductory question Suppose you are faced with the following problem: A group of persons have been given an endowment of 300 NOK each. They can choose to keep the money or to invest it in two games. In each game they can invest 0 NOK, 100 NOK or 200 NOK. The sum of the investments in the two games can not exceed the endowment of 300 NOK. The invested money will be doubled or quadrupled depending on whether the person who has made the investment has a low or a high talent. Each person s talent is randomly assigned. For example a high talented person who invests 200 NOK in a game produces 800 NOK, while a low talented person who invests the same amount produces 400 NOK. When the investment decisions are made each person knows that for each game their co-player will be picked randomly, and that the two players are required to distribute the total production between them. A player and his co-player can differ with respect to both the talent and the investment level. In situations like this there are different views of what constitute a fair distribution: Divide equally: Each player gets half of the total production Divide by investment: Each player gets a proportion of the total production equal to his proportion of the total investment Divide by production: Each player gets his own contribution to the total production On the next screens you will be given three examples of what these principles imply in concrete cases. Navigation To example 1 A-28

29 Navigation Introduction Example 1 Production Person 1 s talent 4 Person 1 s investment decision 200 Person 1 s production 800 Person 2 s talent 2 Person 2 s investment decision 100 Person 2 s production 200 Total production 1000 In this example the different fairness principles have the following implications: Divide equally 500/500 Divide by investment 667/333 Divide by production 800/200 Navigation To example 2 A-29

30 Navigation To example 1 Example 2 Production Person 1 s talent 4 Person 1 s investment decision 100 Person 1 s production 400 Person 2 s talent 4 Person 2 s investment decision 200 Person 2 s production 800 Total production 1200 In this example the different fairness principles have the following implications: Divide equally 600/600 Divide by investment 400/800 Divide by production 400/800 Navigation To example 3 A-30

31 Navigation To example 2 Example 3 Production Person 1 s talent 4 Person 1 s investment decision 100 Person 1 s production 400 Person 2 s talent 2 Person 2 s investment decision 100 Person 2 s production 200 Total production 600 In this example the different fairness principles have the following implications: Divide equally 300/300 Divide by investment 300/300 Divide by production 400/200 Navigation Choose a distribution A-31

32 Navigation To example 3 Choose a distribution Please tick off the fairness principle you think give the fairest distribution in these types of situations. Your answer will not restrict the decisions you make later in the experiment, and will not be communicated to other players. Divide equally Divide by investment Divide by production Move on Continue A-32

33 Step 2/7 Information Your participation number 4 Distribution principle registered Your choice of fairness principle is registered. Instruction Please wait until the session administrator asks you to continue. Do not press the key Continue until you are asked to do so. Move on Continue A-33

34 Step 3/7 Information Your participation number 4 Your talent 4 Production phase You have an endowment of 300 NOK to invest, and you have three investment choices in each game. NOK 0 NOK 100 NOK 200 Game 1 Game 2 NOK 0 NOK 0 Your investment choice NOK 100 NOK 100 NOK 200 NOK 200 Move on Continue A-34

35 Step 4/7 Information Your participation number 4 Your talent 4 Investment decision registered Your investment decision is registered. Investment decision Game 1 Game 2 Your investment choice Instruction Please wait until the session administrator asks you to continue. Do not press the key Continue until you are asked to do so. Move on Continue A-35

36 Step 5/7 Information Your participation number 4 Your talent 4 Game 1 Production Your talent 4 Your investment decision 200 Your production 800 Your co-player s talent 4 Your co-player s investment decision 100 Your co-player s production 400 Total production 1200 In step 1 you ticked off that it is fair to divide equally. This will have the following implication in this game. For you: 600 For your co-player: 600 Distribution Your proposal for the distribution of 1200 NOK: For you NOK. For your co-player NOK.. Game 2 Production Your talent 4 Your investment decision 100 Your production 400 Your co-player s talent 2 Your co-player s investment decision 200 Your co-player s production 400 Total production 800 In step 1 you ticked off that it is fair to divide equally. This will have the following implication in this game. For you: 400 For your co-player: 400 Distribution Your proposal for the distribution of 800 NOK: For you NOK. For your co-player NOK.. Move on Continue A-36

37 Step 6/7 Information Your participation number 4 Your talent 4 Distribution decision registered Your proposals for the distribution of total production are registered. Instruction Please wait until the session administrator asks you to continue. Do not press the key Continue until you are asked to do so. Move on Continue A-37

38 Step 7/7 Information Your participation number 4 Your talent 4 Payment You will only get the pay-off from one of the two games. You will get the pay-off from game 2. Total production in this game was 800. Your distribution proposal was chosen, and your pay-off is 600. Your payment will be 600 (your pay-off) + 0 (amount not invested) = 600. Your payment code is Needed information Payment 600 Payment code In order to get your payment, please fill in the form, which is in the plastic folder on your desk. Write the correct payment code down carefully. If you use an incorrect code you will not get paid. Please record your payment code in case you should need to contact the Accounting Division about the payment. End Thank you for your participation in this experiment. You may now exit your web browser. Please remain seated until you are asked to leave. A-38