The Political Game of European Fisheries Management

Transkript

1 The Political Game of European Fisheries Management Margrethe Aanesen and Claire W Armstrong, Environmental and Resource Economics (2016) 63,

2 Background Jensen, F. and N.Vestergaard (2002) Management of Fisheries in the EU: A principal-agent Analysis. Marine Resource Economics, 16, Optimal regulation under asymmetric information. On EU level: Tax instead of TAC.

3 The model Players EU authorities (principal) Memeber state authorities (principal) Fishers organisation (agent) Assumptions Utility maximising Symmetric and complete information Nash equilibirium (noncooperative)

4 The utility functions Each agent has utility depending on environmental, economic and social factors. UU ii = λ 1ii EEEEEE +λ 2i * ECO + λ 3i *SOC EEEEEE = PP qq KK EE 1 qqqq rr ECO = pp qq KK EE(1-(q*E/r))-a*E SOC = S*E

5 The games Stackelberg First, EU sets the overarching rules Next, MS decides how to implement the rules in their countries Finally, fishers decide their fishing behaviour given the rules Cournot EU and MS simultaneously set the rules (i.e. EU decides the rules and MS decides how to implement them) Fishers decide their fishing behavious given the rules and the enforcement

6 The game (Stackelberg) Fishers EU authorities Member state authorities

7 The game (Cournot) EU authorities Fishers Member state authorities

8 The regulation The Walsh contract W = w 0 + w 1 *E

9 Solving the model Static constrained optimisation problem: tt ii EEEE = gg ii (λ iiii, PP, pp, qq, KK, rr, SS) vv ii MMMM = h ii (λ iiii, PP, pp, qq, KK, rr, SS) optimal responses EE ii kk = ffff(λ iiii, PP, pp, qq, KK, rr, SS)

10 Example of solution of the Cournot game

11 Data Social EU MS Fishers ENV ECO SOC Biological/economic parameter Size r q K 349.8k tons p 2500 EUR/tons a EUR/unit effort P S 2500 EUR/tons EUR/unit effort

12 Results (unrealistic?) Stackelberg EU (EUR per effort hour) MS (EUR per effort hour) Aggregate (EUR per effort hour) Fishers effort level (fishing hours) - One regulator ,200 - Two regulators ,550 Cournot - One regulator ,200 - Two regulators ,550

13 Data Social EU MS Fishers ENV ECO SOC Biological/economic parameter Size r q K 349.8k tons p 2500 EUR/tons a EUR/unit effort P S 2500 EUR/tons EUR/unit effort

14 Results (more realistic?) Stackelberg EU (EUR per effort hour) MS (EUR per effort hour) Aggregate (EUR per effort hour) Fishers effort level (fishing hours) - One regulator ,500 - Two regulators ,750 Cournot - One regulator ,500 - Two regulators ,750

15 Data Social EU MS Fishers ENV ECO SOC Biological/economic parameter Size r q K 349.8k tons p 2500 EUR/tons a EUR/unit effort P S 2500 EUR/tons EUR/unit effort

16 Results (mimicking reality) Stackelberg EU (EUR per effort hour) MS (EUR per effort hour) Aggregate (EUR per effort hour) Fishers effort level (fishing hours) - One regulator ,800 - Two regulators ,150 Cournot - One regulator ,800 - Two regulators ,150

17 Robustness of the model Social EU MS Fishers ENV??? ECO??? SOC - / - - / - + / + Biological/economic parame ter Effort r 10 0 q K p a Regulation P S

18 Conclusions Two layers of regulators with relatively similar preferences will increase the aggregate regulation, but the original regulator will modify their regulation when a second regulator is introduced (strategic effect) Similar preference weights for the regulators will imply similar regulations, whereas with diverging preferences the regulation set by one regulator may be countered by the regulation set by the other regulator, resulting in a insignificant aggregate regulation.

19 Thank you for your attention. Margrethe Aanesen and Claire W Armstrong, Environmental and Resource Economics (2016) 63,

20 Hva er tapet i velferd om fiskelokasjonen forsvinner? Kompenserende variasjon - Dersom folk i utg.pkt. har rett til å fiske der: - WTA: da må folk bli kompensert hvis lokasjonen skal brukes til andre formål - WTP: næringsvirksomhet må betale for å bruke lokasjonen til andre formål Ekvivalent variasjon - Dersom folk må godta en situasjon som den etter at det har vært gjort inngrep rundt lokasjonen: - WTP: folk må spørres om sin betalingsvillighet for å unngå at lokasjonen blir brukt annerledes - WTA: næringsvirksomhet må bli kompensert for å la være å bruke lokasjonen til andre formål

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