Resilience: Robust og dynamisk i Arktis?

Transkript

1 Resilience: Robust og dynamisk i Arktis? Trygg & Frisk? HMS-forskning for norsk petroleumsvirksomhet Forskningsrådet/ Petroleumstilsynet, Stavanger, 24. mai 2011 Ranveig Kviseth Tinmannsvik, SINTEF 1

2 Building Safety et samarbeid for utvikling av robuste organisasjoner Å utvikle kunnskap for å bygge robuste organisasjoner for petroleumsaktivitet i nordområdene, og å unngå uønskede hendelser gjennom tidlig varsling/ proaktive indikatorer. 2

3 Organisatorisk redundans Organisatorisk redundans innebærer samhandlingsmønstre som gjør at organisasjonen er mer pålitelig enn enkeltpersoner Organisatorisk redundans skapes ved at personer rådfører seg med hverandre, sjekker hverandre og korrigerer hverandre Diversitet og tillit er viktige aspekter ved organisatorisk redundans

4 Strategier for feiltoleranse Feiltoleranse kan bl.a. oppnås gjennom: 1) Barrierer 2) Robust arbeidspraksis i det daglige 3) Evne til improvisasjon Barrierer tiltak som er iverksatt for å bryte et spesifisert hendelsesforløp. Robust arbeidspraksis de små grepene en dyktig fagperson gjør for å beskytte seg selv og andre mot farer. Evne til improvisasjon problemløsing i krisesituasjoner.

5 Etterlevelse av regler vs. kompetanse til å håndtere uforutsette situasjoner

6 Menneskelige og organisatoriske bidrag til robusthet Har studert vellykket gjenvinning av faresituasjoner: Hvorfor gikk det bra? Utvikling av Contributing Success Factors - CSFs Resilience attributes Make sure that risk awareness is maintained (avoid underestimation of risk) CSF 1: Risk Awareness Be able to provide necessary capasity to respond, given a deviation or incident CSF 2: Response Capacity Be able to support decisions (remedy of goal-conflicts) in order to maintain critical functions (given a deviation or incident) CSF 3: Support Understand anticipate and monitor Respond completely and timely Give support and ensure support Risk understanding Response Robustness Resourcefulness/ Redundancy Anticipation Attention Decision support (incl. improvisation) (of response) rapidity (for support) How do we achieve knowledge and experience about risk/hazards? What can we expect? What should we look for? What must we do? How can we ensure completion of the response (without suffering damage)? How can we ensure timely and sufficient response? How do we support the trade-off between safety and production? How do we compensate for degradation to uphold/ maintain critical functions? 6

7 Indikatorer for tidlig varsling av storulykker Utvikling av REWI Resilience based Early Warning Indicators To ulike tilnærminger: Bygge videre på Contributing Success Factors CSFs Dra nytte av en metode anvendt i kjernekraft: Leading Indicators for Organizational Health - LIOH CSFs LIOH REWI CSFs Generelle tema Indikatorer 7

8 REWI - Resilience based Early Warning Indicators Resilience refers to the capability of recognizing, adapting to, and coping with the unexpected (Woods, 2006). Resilience attributes Contributing Success Factor General issue Selected general issue Selected indicators Make sure that risk awareness is maintained (avoid underestimation of risk) CSF 1: Risk Awareness Be able to provide necessary capasity to respond, given a deviation or incident CSF 2: Response Capacity Be able to support decisions (remedy of goal-conflicts) in order to maintain critical functions (given a deviation or incident) CSF 3: Support Understand anticipate and monitor Respond completely and timely Give support and ensure support How do we achieve knowledge and experience about risk/hazards? What can we expect? What should we look for? What must we do? How can we ensure completion of the response (without suffering damage)? How can we ensure timely and sufficient response? How do we support the trade-off between safety and production? How do we compensate for degradation to uphold/maintain critical functions? Risk understanding Robustness Resourcefulness/rapidity (for 1.1 Anticipation 1.2 Attention 1.3 Response Decision support 3.1 Redundancy 3.2 (incl. improvisation) (of response) support) System knowledge Safety performance matters requested by senior management No. of violations to authorized entrance of systems Portion of operating personnel familiar with design assumptions Turnover of operating personnel last 6 months Fraction of serious loss of barrier cases with senior mgmt. involvement No. of HSE initiatives taken by senior management Risk/hazard identification (Hazid, ) Portion of affected personnel participated in Hazid for specific operation Fraction of SJAs checked by independent person Fraction of operational procedures that have been risk assessed Bypass of control and safety functions Activity level / simultaneous operations Changes; technical, organizational, external (weather, ) No. of unauthorized bypasses/overrides during last 3 months No. of instances of hot work permits checked againts QRA assumptions No. of changes/ modifications of technical equipment last month Portion of decision processes not involving required functions/personnel Training (simulators, table-top, preparedness, ) Handling of exceptions (beyond day to day operations) No. of different accident scenarios included in exercises last month Fraction of work processes/ procedures verified/ tested in simulators No. of exceptions handled by operating personnel last month Adequate decision Communication Adequate resource support staffing between actors allocation and staffing (availability & knowl./ (interface control) (incl. buffer capacity) experience) No. of cases in which communication between actors has been inadequate Amount of overtime worked No. of responses closed in time last 3 months No. of cases where responses/actions are transferred to next shift Portion of in-house support personnel practiced offshore last 6 months Criteria for safe operation well defined and understood No. of cases with inadequate decision support from onshore last 3 months No. of simulations where criteria for safe operation have been exceeded Fraction of simulations where exceedance of criteria are accepted by operators Redundancy in information processing Portion of support decisions checked/ verified by independent experts Communicating risk/ resilience at all levels of the organization Portion of company actively using the risk register 8

9 Oppsummering og videreføring Building Safety har tatt tak i utfordringer knyttet til petroleumsvirksomhet i nordområdene; kjennetegnet ved et røft klima, en sårbar natur og ekstremt strenge miljøkrav. Prosjektet har utviklet kunnskap for å bygge robuste organisasjoner med Goliatutbyggingen i Barentshavet som case. Robuste organisasjoner ( Resilience Engineering ) handler om evnen til å gjenkjenne, tilpasse seg, og å kunne håndtere uforutsette situasjoner. Utvikling av robuste organisasjoner utfyller den tradisjonelle tilnærmingen til sikkerhet, der man i stor grad planlegger og gjennomfører sikkerhetstiltak basert på risikoanalyse av hendelser som kan identifiseres i forkant. Prosjektet har publisert 10 artikler i vitenskaplige tidsskrift med referee i tillegg til 20 konferanseartikler. Fireårig prosjekt; total ramme er 13,2 mill. kr (inkl. dr.gradsstipend). Vil du vite mer: Prosjektet videreføres i et prosjekt som pågår nå: ReSMaM Resilience based Safety Management and Monitoring. 9

10 Takk for oppmerksomheten! 10